11	Ap	ril	1951	
\overline{C}	nn	$N \cap$	01.	9

25X1

25X1

DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS, CHANGED TO: TS S 7 14
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH; _HR 70-2
DATE 2 - 70-2 AREVERS

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

TOP SECRET

DOS review(s) completed.

Approved For Release 2003/09/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100540001-0

25X1A		
Appròved	For Release 2003/09/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00010054	0001-0

SUMMARY

2. Nego	tiations for de	efense of Ice	land being fina	alized (page 3).	
		EASTERN B	EUROPE		
4. Yugo	slavs seek to	assign war (correspondent	to Korea (page	5).
. *					
					
				·.	
		- 2		÷.	

25X1A

Approved For Release 2003/09/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100540001-0

	GENERAL	
	· ·	
	2. Negotiations for defense of Iceland being finalized:	TOF LAND
	Iceland's Foreign Minister has presented a draft of the US-Iceland defense agreement	V.S
4	which, in the opinion of the US Legation in	
	Reykjavik, leaves no important points unresolved. The Foreign Minister reportedly hopes to obtain speedy approval of the draft by the Cabinet and by next leaders. At a later data	
	proval of the draft by the Cabinet and by party leaders. At a later date he intends to present to the Althing only the short basic agreement (whi	
	- 3 -	
	25X1A	

25X1A Approved For Release 2003/09/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100540001-0

provides broadly that Keflavik Airport facilities will be made available to the armed forces of NATO parties for the defense of Iceland) but he desires to hold to a minimum published material regarding the detailed annexes (which specify the composition of the forces and the conditions under which they will utilize Icelandic facilities).

Comment: Negotiations will probably continue for a least another two weeks, since the Icelandic draft must obtain US approval and thus may be subject to a few minor changes. Absolute agreement on the duration of the pact has not been reached, and it is expected that Iceland will continue to insist on some recognition of its right to terminate the pact unilaterally. The Foreign Minister feels assured of sufficient support among the non-Communist Althing members to secure approval of the agreement, which will probably be presented in special session, since the Althing has adjourned for the summer.

ZOVI	
₩	
:	
•	
-	
.	
₩	
1	

25X1A			

Approved For Release	2003/09/26 :	CIA-RDP79T009	75A0001	0540001-0
----------------------	--------------	---------------	---------	-----------

EASTERN EUROPE

4.	Yugoslavs seek to assign war correspondent to Korea:	
25X1A	US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade reports that the editor of the Belgrade daily Politika has requested US assistance in obtaining permission for a Yugoslav newspaperman to be accredited as a war correspondent in Korea. Ambassador Allen considers it decidedly in the US interest for Yugoslavia to have its own correspondent in Korea, since articles written by a Yugoslav correspondent would have a greater impact on Yugoslav public opinion than foreign news stories republished in Yugoslav papers. Allen comments that the Yugoslav Government may desire to change its Korean policy from neutrality to active support of the UN and may wish to assign a Yugoslav correspondent to Korea in order to develop an internal basis for	
	Comment: Yugoslav coverage of the Korean war would probably be useful not only within Yugoslavia but also throughout Eastern Europe in countering Soviet fabrications regarding the Korean war. Since the Yugoslav Government has been gradually moving from its independent position between East and West to one of closer alignment with the West and is now seeking both military and economic assistance from Western sources, the government is probably willing to	
25X6	give moral support to UN action in Korea. However, it is not likely to support any UN action which, in its opinion, might expand the war in the Far East and thereby weaken Western Europe.	
25X6	give moral support to UN action in Korea. However, it is not likely to support any UN action which, in its opinion, might expand the war in the	·
25X6	give moral support to UN action in Korea. However, it is not likely to support any UN action which, in its opinion, might expand the war in the Far East and thereby weaken Western Europe.	
25X6	give moral support to UN action in Korea. However, it is not likely to support any UN action which, in its opinion, might expand the war in the	
25X6	give moral support to UN action in Korea. However, it is not likely to support any UN action which, in its opinion, might expand the war in the Far East and thereby weaken Western Europe.	
25X6	give moral support to UN action in Korea. However, it is not likely to support any UN action which, in its opinion, might expand the war in the Far East and thereby weaken Western Europe.	
25X6	give moral support to UN action in Korea. However, it is not likely to support any UN action which, in its opinion, might expand the war in the Far East and thereby weaken Western Europe.	
25X6	give moral support to UN action in Korea. However, it is not likely to support any UN action which, in its opinion, might expand the war in the Far East and thereby weaken Western Europe. - 5 -	